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Abstract:  
Sustained energy price increases in the United States have preceded declines in 
economic activity as far back as 1890. This finding applies to two different historical GDP data 
sets. It suggests a much longer national experience with rising energy prices that began well 
before the period after World War Two. This problem emerged well before the US transition 
towards petroleum products when coal was an important energy source. This relationship 
varies with the state of the economy and appears less evident during some periods, as in the 
years following the 1929 stock market crash.   
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 1. Introduction 
Oil supply shocks have dominated the political and economic landscape during the last 
three decades of the twentieth century. These events often caused economic recession and 
changed political leadership within the United States (Blinder and Watson, 2016). Today many 
news organizations and central banks around the globe follow oil price movements with intense 
interest. Although recent studies have downplayed the significance of oil supply shocks under 
current conditions, this topic continues to attract much attention because political unrest and 
military conflicts remain important factors in some critical petroleum supply regions (Jaffe and 
Elass, 2015). These areas continue to supply significant amounts of crude oil, even with the 
recent expansion with U.S. production.  
It is appropriate that the oil supply shock literature has focused on the years after World 
War Two. During this period oil began replacing coal as the energy engine for the U.S. economy. 
It is also the era when global oil production began to shift towards the Middle East. Founded in 
1963, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) eventually became a dominant 
energy supplier whose decisions greatly affected global petroleum markets. However, this focus 
masks the prior U.S. experience with energy shocks in previous decades. Pre-war energy price 
shocks have been very large and approximately similar in magnitude to oil price shocks after 
World War Two, as will be shown below. This analysis extends coverage to the earlier U.S. 
experience and tries to develop meaningful conclusions from this historical record about the 
impact of energy price shocks on the economy. A key finding is that sustained energy price 
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increases in the United States have preceded many declines in economic activity as far back as 
1890.  
There are several important reasons for extending this discussion to the earlier years. 
First, major energy supply disruptions are relatively uncommon events, limited to the 1970s 
with smaller hostile curtailments in late 1956 and 1990. Expanding the sample to include more 
natural “experiments” may provide additional insights. Second, it is important to know if and 
when price shocks have been important to the US economy and under what economic 
conditions. Energy price shocks are only one of many factors that could lead to economic 
recession. Its impact on the economy will depend upon the presence or absence of these other 
factors. Third, understanding the economy’s response prior to its dependence upon petroleum 
may be particularly valuable for developing insights about a range of current issues. If other 
energy forms like coal also created similar problems, it suggests that policy analysis might want 
to be concerned about sudden price movements for other energy forms like natural gas and 
electricity, particularly as the economy begins its transition towards electricity and away from 
coal, oil and other carbon-intensive fuels. Fourth, it may be illuminating to study a period when 
the US economy produced virtually all energy that it consumed rather than import significant 
volumes. If previous periods indicate significant economic costs from energy shocks, the 
problem may have less to do with whether energy sources are imported or produced 
domestically. And fifth, there are advantages to studying a period when energy use represented 
a much larger share of the economy than it does today. Although many factors and conditions 
shape the economy’s response to energy price shocks, the relative dependence upon energy 
inputs could potentially be important.  
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The next section discusses previous studies of energy price shocks and how they relate 
to the long-run historical experience considered here. Section 3 examines the 1890-1930 period 
and the growing importance of coal mining and the organization of coal unions. Section 4 
discusses the historical data set and its principal properties. Section 5 documents the 
econometric evidence on the oil-economy response across two very different periods that 
precede and follow the Great Depression of the 1930s. Due to the importance of many other 
factors causing economic recessions, the estimates test robustness by incorporating various 
controls and sample sizes for excluding major wars, depressions, financial collapses and rapidly 
growing global oil demand. Importantly, the analysis demonstrates these results for two 
different historical estimates for economic growth. Summary remarks are outlined in the final 
section. 
2. Past Studies 
 
This approach builds upon two recent efforts to probe the historical “roots” of energy 
supply shocks and their impact on the economy. Hamilton (2012) reviews a number of very 
large oil price shocks and emphasizes the role played by geopolitical and military events that 
are largely external to oil consumers, oil suppliers from more stable regions and 
macroeconomic policy. A second important contribution is the analysis by van de Ven and 
Fouquet (2014) of the UK experience with a combination of coal and oil price shocks over 
several centuries. These authors employ the long and rich data available for the British 
economy and show that there are important similarities and differences between major time 
periods.  
4 
 
A number of studies have evaluated the economic impacts of oil price shocks, a fact that 
is amply demonstrated by several important articles that review the literature (Brown and 
Yücel, 2002, Jones, Leiby and Paik, 2004, and Kilian, 2008). Rather than repeat many of the 
insights from these review papers, this section will briefly mention a few points that tie directly 
to the current effort. Surprise price shocks lasting more than a few quarters and sustained over 
at least a year appear more debilitating that simple oil price oscillation (Hamilton, 1983, 1996). I 
will use the term “sustained price shocks” in the sections below to differentiate these sharp, 
sudden and unexpected disruptive price movements from price oscillations in the absence of a 
major market correction or adjustment. Sustained price shocks need not be permanent, but 
they should last for more than a quarter and should be sufficiently disruptive to lead directly to 
an underutilized capital stock.  
Oil price shocks caused economic recessions in other OECD countries, regardless of 
whether these nations imported or exported petroleum (Bruno and Sachs, 1985, Mork, Olsen 
and Mysen, 1994, and Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2005). Smaller price movements 
appearing in many years after the 1970s had very little if any influence on economic 
performance, e.g., see the exchange between Hooker (1996) and Hamilton (1996). Similarly, oil 
price declines had no detectable effects (Mork 1989).  Recent studies (e.g., Kilian 2009) indicate 
the importance of separating oil supply from oil demand shocks.  Finally, a series of recent 
studies have shown that although oil price shocks still matter for the economy, the economic 
impacts are less (Nordhaus, 2007, Blanchard and Galí, 2010, and Blinder and Rudd, 2013) than 
in the past (Hickman et al, 1987). Several researchers have argued that the nature of this oil 
price shock has changed quite dramatically over time. Naccache (2010) explained the 
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weakening of the oil-macroeconomic relationship by the increasing experience with “slow” 
rather than sudden oil price increases. Nordhaus (2007) too emphasized that oil price 
movements in more recent periods occur more gradually over relatively long periods rather 
than as sudden surprise jolts. Finally, Gronwald (2012) provided convincing evidence of the 
dominant effect of the 1973-74 oil price shock in explaining poor macroeconomic 
performances, implying that many later price movements were not really price shocks in the 
same sense of earlier experiences. 
For the most part, this literature has focused exclusively on oil prices in the period after 
World War Two. Important exceptions include an analysis of west coast gasoline rationing in 
the 1920s (Olmstead and Rhode, 1985) and an assessment of oil price increases on industrial 
production during the interwar period (Mcmillin and Parker, 1994). Both studies document that 
these regional price shocks during these interwar years were accompanied by sharp downward 
movements in regional output and employment but not necessarily in their national 
counterparts.  
3. The Pre-World-War-Two Period 
In 1890 the fossil fuel transition within the United States was beginning to evolve, with 
coal becoming the dominant energy source (Figure 1). Coal was used for power, first in 
industrial processes and later in electric power in the early 20th century. The growth in 
electricity replaced petroleum in lighting applications, but eventually oil became the major fuel 
in transportation. During World War Two, petroleum became the dominant U.S. energy source 
economywide, although other fossil fuels (coal and natural gas) have also remained important.  
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Energy was substantially more important for the economy in the 1890-1930 period than 
after World War Two. Per dollar of real GDP, coal use intensity peaked around World War One 
and dominated the trend in energy intensity1  until after World War Two, as shown in Figure 2. 
Petroleum use intensity emerged as an important contributor between the major wars, but 
total energy intensity declined substantially with coal intensity after 1920.  
The economy depended mostly upon domestic rather than imported energy supplies 
during this earlier period. Although coal and oil are two energy sources that can be traded 
relatively easily, Figure 3 shows that US coal imports have never comprised an important share 
of the domestic market and that oil imports were not important until after 1970.2  
Strikes by labor organizations and unions in the coal industry in the early twentieth 
century happened much more frequently than elsewhere in the economy (Fishback, 1992). 
More man-days were lost and a larger percentage of the coal workforce was affected than in 
other sectors.  
During the early years of the 1890 decade, organizations representing coal workers 
extended their presence piecemeal, focusing upon one small strike after another (Blatz, 1991). 
Organization efforts usually focused on work rules and local issues at a single or several coal 
mines. Coal prices were relatively stable in these early years. The United Mine Workers of 
                                                          
1 Energy intensity trends are based upon GDP estimates (see Data Appendix) and primary energy consumption 
reported by U.S. Energy Information Administration (2011). The latter are reported for every five years only prior 
to 1949. For this reason, it is not possible to weight the energy price shocks by energy intensity in the regressions.            
2 Oil import shares for 1910-2015 and coal import shares for 1970-2015 are computed from annual data derived 
from the US Energy Information Administration. Coal import shares prior to 1970 are computed as the percent of 
derived coal consumption (production + imports – exports) from US Bureau of the Census (1975) Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1. Series M 93-106. Coal imports from the two sources 
are from the same source and match exactly for the period that they both report, 1970-2015. Net natural gas 
imports first became positive but by very small amounts in 1958 (American Gas Association (1978), pp. 23).  
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America (UMWA) organized a nationwide strike in bituminous industry in 1897. The union won 
recognition from many coal mine operators stretching from western Pennsylvania to Illinois.  
UMWA organized an industrywide strike for workers in bituminous coal in 1900 
resulting in a 10 percent increase in wages. Nationwide, BLS coal prices increased 9.5% faster 
than during the previous year. The following year, the US economy grew by 2.8 percentage 
points less than the previous year. These events set the stage for the much-publicized coal 
strike of 1902 that was eventually suspended by a commission established by President 
Theodore Roosevelt. UMWA won recognition for representing anthracite coal workers in 
eastern Pennsylvania and raised wages. Nationwide, BLS coal prices increased 5.5 percentage 
points faster than during the previous year. The following year, the US economy grew by 7.4 
percentage points less than the previous year. 
Figure 4 shows the time profile of annual changes in the average energy price since 
1890. This figure clearly documents why economists studying the energy price shock problem 
should be fascinated with this previous period. Energy price changes prior to 1947 displayed 
similar patterns to those after 1947 and in some cases represented larger annual price changes 
than during the later years. These earlier energy price movements happened at a time when 
the economy experienced a much greater dependence on energy sources per dollar of real 
GDP.  
8 
 
4. Data Sources and Properties  
Historical annual data on real GDP was combined with an annual series on energy prices 
derived principally from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.3 The Millennial Edition of Historical 
Statistics of the United States edited by Carter et al (2006) developed an extensive historical 
data set (Sutch, 2006) on the US economy and its growth rate since 1790 with the goal of 
achieving consistency throughout the horizon. They label their preferred measure for inflation-
adjusted economic growth as the “Millennial” series.  They based their gross domestic product 
(GDP) estimates on appropriate adjustments to the standard Kuznets-Kendrick-Gallman gross 
national product (GNP) series used by other researchers because it is the only one based 
directly on data. They also provide an alternative Johnston-Williamson indirect measure based 
upon regression-filtered series that will be referenced as “Alternative GDP” below when 
robustness tests are evaluated for a second historical data set on economic growth.4 The 
availability of a second data set on economic growth is important for robustness testing, given 
the significant challenges in constructing a unified and consistent set of estimates. Further 
details on the specifics of these two series can be found in the full description of the Millennial 
project provided by Sutch (2006).  
In addition, energy price series are available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) for aggregate fuel and power that includes all energy forms, including major fossil fuel 
sources such as coal, oil and natural gas. The BLS index covers domestic but not international 
                                                          
3 The Data Appendix explains the construction of the real GDP and energy price series for the full 1890-2014 
sample.  
4 Although the estimated equations below differ from each other, the two real GDP series appear somewhat 
similar both in the data summary presented in Table 1 as well as time-series charts comparing economic growth 
rates in the two series that are available from the author. 
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crude oil prices.  BP Statistics (2015) provides data for domestic crude oil through 1944 and for 
international crude oil between 1945 and 2014. 
All variables are converted to first differences in their logarithms. Table 1 summarizes 
the means and standard deviations of the change in each variable over the 1891-2014 period.5  
5. Empirical Evidence  
The analysis initially considered the periods before the 1929 Stock Market Crash and 
after the Great Depression as two separate samples.6 One of the interesting conclusions from 
evaluating these subsamples was the importance of lagged GDP effects covering at least two 
years for the earlier period. This longer lag length for the earlier period may reflect the fact that 
reconstructed historical data tends to contain some smoothing to reduce the volatility in the 
output series. It will be important to include these lagged GDP effects when evaluating the 
combined-sample data that are discussed below. 
A second essential finding was that the estimates based upon annual data for the period 
after 1947 served as a useful benchmark for comparison with estimates based upon quarterly 
data that have appeared in many previous studies. Energy price increases tend to be followed 
by slower GDP growth, whereas the effect of GDP growth on energy prices generally is 
insignificant. Moreover, based upon either the BLS or BP oil price series as well as the aggregate 
                                                          
5 Adjusted Dickey-Fuller tests reported in Huntington (2016) indicate that energy price and real GDP levels are not 
stationary (unit roots cannot be rejected) but their first differences are stationary. As a caveat, although the full 
sample includes 125 observations, Pindyck (1999) warns about the limitations of unit root tests in limited samples 
when the mean-reverting process is relatively slow. Johansen tests indicate that the levels of energy prices and 
real GDP are not cointegrated. For these reason, the estimates are based upon first differences in the data.  
6 Interested readers are referred to Huntington (2016) for a range of tests for choosing the lag length and exploring 
robustness in the specifications in these subperiods. This analysis also provides a chart showing the impulse 
responses for the nominal energy price shock equal to the unexpected one standard deviation of the error term. 
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energy price variable, the largest economic impacts occur approximately one year after the 
energy price shock. This timing is comparable to the quarterly results where the largest 
response occurs four quarters after the shock. It is often the fourth-quarter lagged response 
that is significant at conventional levels in the studies evaluating quarterly data. Although 
annual energy price movements may understate the volatility of quarterly price fluctuations, 
they may be more relevant for representing sustained price shifts that cause the capital stock 
to become seriously underutilized. The events surrounding the oil price shock may be as 
important as the actual oil-price trajectory itself.  
A third interesting finding is that the significance of the annual oil or aggregate energy 
price effect after World War Two is robust to a number of different specifications, including 
separating price increases from price decreases, price increases due to oil supply disruptions 
from other price movements, real versus nominal energy prices, and for different breaks in the 
sample (before 2009, before 2002, before and after 1973). These additional tests are important 
in order to control for other important factors that could influence the response of the 
economy to oil price movements.  
The rest of this section evaluates the combined period of the years preceding 1930 and 
the years following either 1933 or 1947. It is important to exclude the Great Depression years 
of 1930-33 where factors other than energy prices were clearly influencing economic growth. 
As a robustness test, it is also interesting to exclude the years 1930-47, because many of the 
energy price movements in this period were regional rather than national shocks.  
The estimates below control for the Great Recession’s impact on the economy in 2009. 
Excluding the dummy variable for 2009 increases the magnitude and significance of the lagged 
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price effects, but the basic conclusions are very similar. Without this control, too much of the 
economic deterioration would be attributed to the rapid crude oil price increase in 2008 when 
clearly the financial collapse and other related factors were the principal cause. 
In evaluating the period prior to 1930, it is important to control through a dummy 
variable for the substantial energy price increase in 1917 due to the USA joining the Allies. This 
control influences the economic activity response in 1918 because energy price changes have a 
one-year lagged effect. This response most likely reflected a demand-pull rather than supply-
push stimulus to petroleum prices.  
The specifications initially used two lags for energy prices and real GDP because two lags 
were critical for explaining relationships prior to the Great Depression. Data constraints on 
other reasonable variables restrict the approach to be a bivariate (low dimension) model that 
limits the use of a structural VAR approach to differentiate supply and demand shocks (Kilian, 
2009, and Kilian and Murphy, 2012).7 Although the specification does not establish causality as 
convincingly as a structural approach, it does explain the conditional expectation of GDP growth 
provided that there is information about lagged values for GDP growth and oil price changes.   
Granger causality tests in Table 2 show that energy price shocks precede aggregate 
economic downturns over this combined sample regardless of which years are excluded or 
                                                          
7 The supplementary analysis by Huntington (2016, p.9) discusses this data problem in greater depth. 
With lower-frequency annual rather than monthly data, there exists a greater chance that identified 
shocks are actually a coincidence (van de Ven and Fouquet, 2014, p.10). One candidate variable for 
inclusion in an SVAR would be aggregate energy production. Unfortunately, aggregate conditions often 
reveal little about oil market shortfalls concentrated in the Persian Gulf and neighboring countries 
because production offsets often occur in the non-impacted areas (Hamilton, 2003, 2013). Applying 
SVAR under these conditions could lead to counterintuitive results. Similar concerns would also result in 
coal markets, where regional rather than national shortfalls are often the critical factor.  
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whether oil prices are deflated or not. For example, they reject the hypothesis that past 
nominal energy prices can be excluded as a predictor of economic growth for the period prior 
to 1933 and after 1947 with chi-square=14.80 (significant at 0.1% level). Tests applied to the 
equation explaining energy prices do not reject excluding past economic growth as a predictor 
in any case.  
Estimated coefficients for explaining real GDP since 1892 when it is measured by the 
Millennial series are reported in Table 3. Coefficients and standard errors are shown for the 
constant, two lagged values of the energy price series and real GDP, and dummy control 
variables for economic growth in 1918 and 2009. Specifications with both nominal (columns 1 
and 3) and real (columns 2 and 4) energy prices are shown for robustness. Nominal oil price 
movements would be the key driver in a neo-Keynesian system with downward wage and price 
stickiness in the short run. Nominal prices are also likely to be more exogenous than real oil 
prices because the shock would exclude the endogenous response of inflationary policies. 
However, additional estimates based upon real oil prices have also been evaluated as a 
robustness test. This specification would represent the oil price movement as a technology 
shock in a real-business-cycle framework that also included economic dislocations between 
sectors and an underutilized capital stock.8   
The explanatory power of the equations that exclude 1930-47 in the last two columns 
lies between 14.6% and 18.9%, and these estimates are noticeably higher than those that 
exclude only 1930-33. The poor performance of the sample that excludes only 1930-33 is due to 
                                                          
8 Although his arguments favor the neo-Keynesian framework, Mankiw (1989) provides a straightforward 
discussion of these two approaches for explaining aggregate output fluctuations.  
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the insignificant effects for the first and second year lagged effects for real GDP. The lagged 
energy price coefficients, however, are significant in either sample and with either nominal or 
real prices. When lagged two years, the nominal energy price coefficient is significant when 
1930-47 is excluded and just barely misses significance (at 5.5%) when only 1930-33 is 
excluded. In addition, controlling for the stimulating effect of World War One on economic 
growth is also important, as evidenced by its significant coefficient. 
Given the relatively low explanatory power of these equations, it might be useful to 
evaluate whether the responses shifted after the Great Depression. The break between the two 
periods is already given by the 1929 Stock Market Crash in October and does not need an 
Andrews test or some similar procedure to determine when the break occurs. Using interaction 
terms, we can construct series for the constant, energy price change and economic growth for 
the later period after 1933 (or 1947).  The estimates in Table 4 exclude the post-depression 
interaction terms for the second-year lagged GDP and the first-year lagged energy price, which 
were never significant and almost always had t-statistics less than unity. Including these two 
terms has very little effect on the other coefficients. 
The explanatory power of these equations is substantially greater than their 
counterparts without the interaction terms in Table 3. The first and second-year lagged effects 
for real GDP are significantly negative in all specifications. Moreover, the first and second-year 
lagged effects of energy prices are significantly negative for seven of the eight coefficients and 
barely misses significance (at 6%) for the eighth one.  For years after the Great Depression, one 
must combine the estimates for the interaction terms with those estimated over the full 
sample. For example, the effect of energy prices lagged two years is often almost zero for the 
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post-1933 years because the positive interaction term essentially cancels the negative 
coefficient for the second-year energy price lag covering all years. This effect tends to make the 
dampening of economic growth due to energy prices greater prior to the Great Depression than 
after it. Simple extrapolations from the coefficients in Table 4 suggest that equilibrium declines 
in economic growth due to an energy price increase may be about 60 percent more in the 
earlier period when the energy intensity was greater.9 One needs to interpret these results 
cautiously, however, because the historical data underlying this earlier experience may 
exaggerate the economic output volatility (Sutch, 2006).  
Controlling for important historical events such as World War One and the recent Great 
Recession is an important adjustment if one wants a richer explanation of the economy’s 
response to energy price movements. Table 5 reports results that repeat the estimations shown 
in Table 4 except that the two yearly dummies for World War One and the recent Great 
Recession are removed. Although the constant, the post-1933 intercept term, and all the GDP 
effects remain significant, the second-year lagged coefficients for energy prices are not 
significant in any of the equations. Moreover, all price effects are noticeably smaller and each 
equation’s explanatory power measured by the adjusted R-squared is noticeably less in Table 5.  
All these results are robust when the previously discussed Alternative real GDP 
estimates replace the Millennial series. Granger causality tests reported in Table 6 continue to 
reject the hypothesis that lagged energy prices (real or nominal) are unimportant in explaining 
                                                          
9 Assume that energy prices increase by one percent in each of the past two years. The equilibrium economic 
growth rate associated with these energy price changes will equal the sum of the two lagged energy price effects 
divided by one minus the sum of the two lagged GDP effects. Based upon the results in column 3 in Table 4, these 
computations result in -0.146% for the earlier period and -0.091% for the later period. These magnitudes are 
purely illustrative and do not represent the impact of an energy price shock on the economy after incorporating all 
of the other effects that operate in the actual economy.  
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economic growth for either time period. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that lagged 
economic growth precedes energy prices. Regression results based upon the Alternative real 
GDP estimates that include the yearly dummy variables for World War One and the Great 
Recession and that do not differentiate between pre- and post-1933 responses are shown in 
Table 7. They are similar to those based upon the Millennial series that were displayed in Table 
3. Most importantly, the significance of the lagged energy price effects remains the same. 
Fewer lagged GDP effects are statistically significant with this GDP series in the sample that 
excludes 1930-47. These equations for this sample have a lower explanatory power than those 
based upon the Millennial series shown in Table 3.10 
6. Conclusion 
The results demonstrate that: (a) there is a negative association between changes in 
energy prices and changes in U.S. GDP in the time before the Great Depression, (b) the earlier 
economy was more dependent on energy inputs and producing most of its energy without 
relying upon fuel imports, and (c) the associated economic impacts of energy price increases 
were higher, perhaps by 60 percent according to the estimates in Table 4, during the period 
before the Great Depression than during the Post‐World War Two period. It is important not to 
overemphasize this effect. There were clearly other key economic policies and conditions that 
were shaping the macroeconomic trends during these times. These empirical estimates, 
however, do show that energy price shocks have deep historical “roots” in the performance of 
the US economy. At the same, they suggest that there are periods, e.g., during the 1930s or 
                                                          
10 However, the explanatory power is higher than in Table 3 when only the 1930-33 years are excluded.  
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perhaps after the 2009 Great Recession, when this relationship may be less pronounced 
depending upon the state of the economy.  
Oscillating energy prices may be a problem, but individuals and firms can adopt 
strategies that circumvent these cyclical price movements. Sustained energy price shocks 
caused by sudden and disruptive supply shortfalls, on the other hand, can lead towards serious 
economic dislocations and unused productive capacity. Sustained energy price increases in the 
United States have preceded many declines in economic activity as far back as 1890. This 
finding suggests a much longer national experience with rising energy prices that began well 
before the period after World War Two. This problem emerged well before the US transition 
towards petroleum products when coal was an important energy source and when most energy 
was produced domestically rather than imported.   
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Data Appendix 
The analysis uses the two Millennial Project series for the period prior to 1929, after converting 
their 1996-dollar estimates to 2009 counterparts using the GDP deflator provided by the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. It merges this data with the most recently available estimates for real GDP that the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis provides for the 1929-2014 period.  
The BP crude oil price series is reported from 1861 in dollars per barrel. Prices through 
1944 are the US average domestic price as reported below for the BLS oil price series. 
Thereafter, they represent international rather than domestic crude oil prices. Prices between 
1945 and 1983 are for Arabian Light crude oil posted at their Ras Tanura oil facility. Prices after 
1983 refer to the Brent crude oil price.  
The BLS oil price series are based upon the BLS price index for domestic crude oil. Prior 
to 1947, they are the average wellhead price as reported in the US Bureau of the Census (1975) 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1. Series M 138-142. The 
BLS producer price index for domestic crude oil is used to develop price estimates after 1946. 
The BLS energy price series before 1926 are the wholesale price index for fuel and 
lighting reported in the US Bureau of the Census (1975) Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1. Series E 40-51. The BLS producer price index for fuel and power 
is used to develop price estimates after 1926. 
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Table 1. Data Summary, 1891-2014 
 
Variable (Change) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
     
Real GDP (Millennial) 0.032 0.054 -0.141 0.173 
Real GDP (Alternative) 0.033 0.050 -0.138 0.173 
Crude Oil Price (BP) 0.038 0.251 -0.647 1.258 
Crude Oil Price (BLS) 0.035 0.218 -0.605 0.542 
Energy Price (BLS) 0.032 0.126 -0.517 0.443 
     
All price and GDP variables are first differences in logarithms. 
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Table 2. Granger Causality Tests for GDP and Energy Prices, Combined Samples 
 GDP Equation  Energy Price Equation 
 
Chi-
square Probability  Chi-square Probability 
1892-1929; 1933-2014      
GDP-Energy Prices 10.249* 0.006  0.428 0.807 
GDP-Real Energy Prices 6.908* 0.032  0.575 0.682 
1892-1929; 1948-2014      
GDP-Energy Prices 14.797* 0.001  0.766 0.750 
GDP-Real Energy Prices 8.762* 0.013  0.101 0.951 
      
* Significantly rejects hypothesis that past energy prices do not explain current GDP at 1% 
level. 
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Table 3. Estimated Coefficients for Real GDP Equation Since 1892 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Energy Price Variable Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Excluded Years 1930-33 1930-33 1930-47 1930-47 
     
GDP(t-1) 0.097 0.096 -0.262** -0.252** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) 
GDP(t-2) -0.065 -0.072 -0.214* -0.213* 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.086) (0.089) 
Energy Price(t-1) -0.101** -0.098* -0.085** -0.08* 
 (0.037) (0.043) (0.029) (0.035) 
Energy Price(t-2) -0.055 -0.061 -0.072* -0.07 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.03) (0.036) 
World War One 0.115* 0.098** 0.112** 0.094* 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.042) (0.043) 
Great Recession -0.043 -0.043 -0.056 -0.056 
 (0.049) (0.05) (0.039) (0.041) 
Constant 0.039** 0.035** 0.051** 0.047** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Adjusted R-square 0.066 0.041 0.189 0.146 
     
Dependent variable is Millennial Real GDP.   
All price and GDP variables are first differences in logarithms. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.   
* indicates 5% significance    
** indicates 1% significance    
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Table 4. Estimated Coefficients for Real GDP Equation Since 1892 Allowing for Post 1933 Breaks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fuel Price Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Excluded Years 1930-33 1930-33 1930-47 1930-47 
     
GDP(t-1) -0.334** -0.327** -0.335** -0.327** 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.103) (0.105) 
GDP(t-2) -0.233** -0.243** -0.231** -0.240** 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.087) (0.09) 
GDP(t-1)>1933 0.935** 0.932** 0.434 0.440 
 (0.177) (0.181) (0.245) (0.251) 
Energy Price (t-1) -0.102** -0.092* -0.099** -0.088* 
 (0.034) (0.04) (0.031) (0.036) 
Energy Price (t-2) -0.130** -0.117 -0.129** -0.115* 
 (0.049) (0.062) (0.043) (0.055) 
Energy Price (t-2)>1933 0.153* 0.129 0.125* 0.104 
 (0.069) (0.082) (0.063) (0.075) 
World War One 0.140** 0.110* 0.138** 0.109* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.044) (0.045) 
Great Recession -0.031 -0.031 -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041) 
year>1933 -0.024* -0.023* -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.051** 0.047** 0.051** 0.047** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Adjusted R-square 0.260 0.222 0.217 0.158 
     
Dependent variable is Millennial Real GDP. 
All price and GDP variables are first differences in logarithms. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* indicates 5% significance 
** indicates 1% significance 
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Table 5. Estimated Coefficients for Real GDP Equation Since 1892 Allowing for  
Post 1933 Breaks Without Year Dummy Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fuel Price Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Excluded Years 1930-33 1930-33 1930-47 1930-47 
 
GDP(t-1) -0.363** -0.352** -0.360** -0.350** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.107) (0.108) 
GDP(t-2) -0.202* -0.216* -0.192* -0.206* 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.092) 
GDP(t-1)>1933 0.960** 0.954** 0.497 0.497 
 (0.182) (0.183) (0.253) (0.255) 
Energy Price (t-1) -0.075** -0.076 -0.073* -0.073* 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.036) 
Energy Price (t-2) -0.080 -0.069 -0.080 -0.069 
 (0.047) (0.058) (0.042) (0.053) 
Energy Price (t-2)>1933 0.097 0.078 0.074 0.058 
 (0.068) (0.080) (0.063) (0.074) 
year>1933 -0.029* -0.027* -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.053** 0.050** 0.052** 0.049** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Adjusted R-square 0.216 0.197 0.140 0.111 
     
Dependent variable is Millennial Real GDP. 
All price and GDP variables are first differences in logarithms. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* indicates 5% significance 
** indicates 1% significance 
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Table 6. Granger Causality Tests for “Alternative GDP” and Energy Prices, Combined Samples 
 
 GDP Equation  Energy Price Equation 
 Chi-square Probability Chi-square Probability 
1892-1929; 1933-2014      
GDP-Energy Prices 10.854** 0.004  0.046 0.977 
GDP-Real Energy Prices 6.34* 0.042  0.443 0.801 
1892-1929; 1948-2014      
GDP-Energy Prices 16.613** 0.000  0.529 0.768 
GDP-Real Energy Prices 7.652* 0.022  0.012 0.994 
      
* Significantly rejects hypothesis that past energy prices do not explain current GDP 
at 5% level.   
** Significantly rejects hypothesis that past energy prices do not explain current GDP 
at 1% level.   
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Table 7. Estimated Coefficients for Alternative Real GDP Equation Since 1892 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Energy Price 
Variable Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Excluded Years 1930-33 1930-33 1930-47 1930-47 
     
GDP(t-1) 0.202* 0.209* -0.154 -0.130 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.096) (0.098) 
GDP(t-2) -0.018 -0.022 -0.100 -0.092 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.088) (0.092) 
Energy Price(t-1) -0.098** -0.091* -0.085** -0.075* 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.026) (0.031) 
Energy Price(t-2) -0.039 -0.036 -0.059* -0.046 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.027) (0.032) 
World War One 0.090 0.071 0.093* 0.071 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) 
Great Recession -0.040 -0.040 -0.052 -0.053 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036) 
Constant 0.033** 0.030** 0.045** 0.040** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Adjusted R-square 0.096 0.063 0.142 0.073 
     
Dependent variable is Alternative Real GDP.   
All price and GDP variables are first differences in logarithms. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.   
* indicates 5% significance    
** indicates 1% significance    
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Figure 1. History of US Energy Consumption, 1775-2015 (Quadrillion BTU) 
 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration; see Data Appendix.  
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Figure 2. Energy Intensity (Thousand BTU/2009 US Dollars) for Different Sources, 1860-2010 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, Carter et al (2006); see Data Appendix.  
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Figure 3. U.S. Energy Import Shares (%), 1910-2015 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration.  
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Figure 4. Percent Change in Average Energy Price, 1890-2014 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Indexes.  
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